Abstract Provenance is a vital requirement for the success of Clouds, and it is associated with many challenges that are difficult to deal with. In this paper, we explore this area, we identify the problems in current Cloud provenance, we identify the challenges of having trustworthy secure Cloud provenance, and we identify the requirements which could address the identified challenges. We then propose a foundation framework for establishing trust in Cloud provenance. Finally, we draw our research agenda in this direction.
Introduction
Cloud computing is relatively a new term in mainstream IT, first popularized in 2006 by Amazon's EC2 [8] . It has emerged from commercial requirements and applications [16] . Establishing trust in Cloud architectures is an important subject that is yet to receive adequate attention from both academia and industry [3, 9, 16, 27] . Logging, auditing and historical data are of tremendous importance for establishing trust in Clouds. This data have different usage, for example, proactive service delivery (incidents and security monitoring), billing, error and forensic investigation. For convenience, in this paper, we refer to this data as log records. Almost all of Clouds' resources generate this data in some way. The importance of such data and its usage is based on the following resource types. Physical resources generate log records related to physical resource status, security and incident reporting. The generated data help in the direction of finding the cause of incidents and for security monitoring. Virtual resources generate log records related to virtual resource status, security and incident reporting. They also generate usage data, which are used for billing customers using IaaS Clouds. Finally, Application resources generate log records related to application resource status, security and incident reporting. They also generate usage data that are used for billing customers using PaaS and SaaS Clouds.
Establishing trust in Cloud systems (as we discussed in [2] ) requires two mutually dependent elements: (a) support infrastructures with trustworthy mechanisms and tools to help Cloud providers automate the process of managing, maintaining and securing their systems (what we referred to as self-managed services [1] ); and (b) develop methods to help Cloud users and providers establish trust in the operational management of the infrastructure.
Our previous work [4] focusses on both points (a and b); specifically, it establishes offline chains of trust across the distributed elements of Clouds physical infrastructure helping self-managed services to securely exchange management data, and it provides a mechanism enabling users to attest to the way Clouds infrastructure is managed. The framework presented in this paper focusses on point (a) by supporting self-managed services with a trustworthy provenance system. This paper, in addition, extends our previous framework's entities to be provenance aware; that is establish offline chains of trust between Cloud entities and the provenance system, collect log records from the distributed elements of Clouds infrastructure, associate important identification metadata with such records in Clouds context and securely push the result to the proposed provenance system. The integrated framework helps in our long vision of establishing trustworthy Clouds.
Log and provenance
Logs and provenance data are distinctly different. Logs provide a sequential history of actions usually relating to a particular process. Provenance generally refers to information that 'helps determine the derivation history of a data product, starting from its original sources' [26] . Provenance goes beyond an individual application or a process and may refer to many pieces of equipment as well as people. Throughout this paper, we refer to logs as being a source of provenance, primarily because in Cloud, logs are used in combination for a similar purpose.
The provenance is provided on Clouds through linking together log records, collected from multiple resources, to provide the complete history of an event or result. Cloud provenance, at present, is associated with the following limitations [5] : the methods followed by Clouds to support provenance queries are basic, and in many cases, such methods are developed on an ad-hoc basis by Cloud system administrators using customized scripts to address a specific event. In addition, current provenance mechanisms are object specific; that is, they do not automate the process of managing different log and audit files and linking dependent log and audit records together. Current log and audit records are not reasonably protected, which in turn affects the creditability of provenance in the Cloud. Moreover, current Cloud provenance mechanisms are deployed and fully controlled by Cloud providers; that is, Cloud users do not have control over such mechanisms, and neither can they access log and audit records.
The identified limitations motivate the need to establish a trustworthy secure Cloud provenance, which we next discuss the complexities exposed in this.
Problem description and objectives
We believe that establishing trustworthy secure Cloud provenance requires great efforts from both academia and industry. One of the main reasons for the complexity of Cloud provenance is that it uses log records which are associated with the following issues:
(i) log records are not properly managed and are dispersed amongst Clouds complex and distributed infrastructure, for example, most of the log records are scattered all around the infrastructure using unstructured and unrelated text files; and (ii) log records do not adhere to any standard format (this covers both the ones generated by different processes and the ones generated by similar processes but from different manufacturers). Also, such log records do not have semantics explaining the meaning of the items of log records.
Provenance in Clouds with the above problems is not practical considering Clouds enormous number of applications, complex infrastructure and huge number of users. In addition, Cloud provenance is even much more complicated than traditional enterprises considering Cloud dynamic nature [1, 6] . The dynamic nature of Clouds results in its desired properties, for example, resource consolidation, resilience, scalability and high availability; however, this dynamism results in new challenges, for example, building a logical sequence of events to investigate an incident for any one application requires data from many sources, which include the application itself, all logs for possible virtual resources that the application could have used, and logs of all physical resources that virtual resources could have used. Administrators must then combine this data correctly by identifying all time intervals when an application used a specific virtual resource, all possible time intervals when these virtual resources used physical resources and then all relevant log files from all related resources. Collecting and combining data from these resources is not easy or practical considering the potential scale of Cloud systems. These, in turn, increase insider threats in Clouds and reduce its trustworthiness, which discourage critical infrastructures to outsource their resources to public Clouds.
We believe that the foundation of providing Cloud provenance requires following key elements: (i) establish semantics and standards of log records which enable the automated understanding of log records as generated by multiple processes; (ii) store log records in a structured, highly available and centralized repository which enable provenance tools to easily and quickly find log records, query them and bind related events together; (iii) provide security measures for storing, querying, transferring and managing log records; and (iv) establish trust in the operation of the processes managing log records which help end users to establish trust in Cloud provenance.
Providing trustworthy secure Cloud provenance is a complex problem that requires lots of efforts. This paper represents the foundation of our planned future work in this direction. It focuses on point (iii) above. In order to clarify the overall picture and to put the proposed scheme in context, the paper also partially discusses points (ii and iv). In addition to points i, ii and iv, this paper does not cover the details of the following: (a) a detailed database management system design for supporting provenance application requirements, (b) a detailed design of the provenance application itself, (c) policy management and enforcement (e.g., log retention policy), (d) detailed discussion about VM agents that manage provenance data inside a VM (we only outlined one aspect of this, that is, secure storage and transfer of provenance data), (e) protecting provenance data and domain credentials once decrypted in memory, and (f) key management.
Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and our contribution. Section 3 introduces Clouds structure and management services. Section 4 presents motivating scenarios. Section 5 discusses the management of provenance data and then extracts the system requirements. Section 6 defines our proposed domain architecture. Section 7 identifies the software services and their functions. Section 8 provides our framework workflow. Section 9 provides an informal threat analysis of the proposed workflow. Finally, we discuss and conclude the paper in Sect. 10.
Related work and contribution
The need for additional provenance information in Cloud computing storage has been well established by MuniswamyReddy et al. [18, 19] . The authors have discussed the requirements for adding data provenance to Cloud storage systems and have analysed several alternative implementations. This is in contrast to our work, which considers the entire Cloud infrastructure and proposes a framework for that. The use of provenance for fault tolerance has also been proposed before for grid computing [10, 30] . One aim is to avoid common modes of failure when attempting to use multiple composite web services. This work provides useful motivation for the collection of provenance data, but the move to Cloud computing requires a new analysis of current problems in the collection of provenance data.
There are many promising tools which could be adapted for use in Cloud environments. Muniswamy-Reddy et al. [18, 19] have already evaluated the use of PASS-the Provenance-Aware Storage System-for Cloud provenance. Reilly and Naughton [24] have proposed extending the Condor batch execution system to capture data on execution environments, machine identities, log files, file permissions and more. While there are significant new challenges on a Cloud infrastructure, the Provenance-Aware Condor System certainly collects the right kind of provenance data.
The need to protect the security and privacy of applications' log records has been discussed in [12, 13] . These papers primarily focus on protecting applications' log records generated by virtual machines which are hosted at a specific physical machine. The authors identify the importance of (but did not address) the distributed log management, as generated by distributed systems, and leave it as future work. Clouds infrastructure is distributed and dynamic by nature which necessitates the need of distributed log management which covers both application and infrastructure management logs.
The authors could not find other related work which use logs as a source of provenance in Cloud environment neither they could find related work covering log management in distributed systems. The idea of this research, in fact, is based on a real problem in Clouds computing (inherited from enterprise infrastructure, the predecessor of Cloud computing). The research problem does not have a practical solution at the time of writing 1 . Cloud providers currently relies on security administrators to manually (supported with basic management tools and in-house scripts) perform the Cloud provenance job. Trustworthy provenance is a key requirement for establishing trustworthy Clouds' self-managed services that support our global vision of establishing trust in Clouds. Our novel contribution in this paper is about covering the foundations of this topic; that is, identify the requirements of Cloud provenance, propose a provenance framework and address some of the identified requirements.
In addition, the proposed provenance framework extends our previous work [4] , which is also part of our contribution to this paper.
Cloud structure and management services
Providing Cloud provenance requires careful understanding of the Cloud taxonomy and management services. This section briefly summarizes our previous work in this direction [1, 3] Cloud resources communicate in a well-organized way, either horizontally or vertically [3] . Horizontal communication is where Cloud resources communicate as peers within a layer, domain or group. Vertical communication, on the other hand, is where Cloud resources communicate with other Cloud resources in the same layer or another layer following a process workflow in either an up-down or down-up direction.
Cloud resources are dynamic which means the following: (a) a specific virtual resource can be hosted at many different physical resources at different times according to a policy; (b) similarly a specific application resource can run on multiple virtual resources that are increased or decreased based on load and a predefined policy controlling such behaviour (i.e., elasticity property [1] ); and (c) from (a and b), we can conclude that a specific application can be hosted under different physical servers.
Virtual control centre
This section outlines part of Cloud's virtual resource management (detailed discussion of which can be found in previous work [1, 3] ). Currently, there are many tools for managing Cloud's virtual resources, for example, vCenter [29] and OpenStack [21] . For convenience, we call such tools using a common name Virtual Control Centre (VCC), which is a Cloud device 2 that manages virtual resources and their interactions with physical resources using a set of software agents. Currently available VCC software agents have many security vulnerabilities and only provide limited automated management services (what we refer to as self-managed services) [3] . For example, the management of Collaborating Virtual Domain and Collaborating Physical Domain is controlled manually by Cloud employees using VCC. VCC manages the infrastructure by establishing communication channels with physical servers to manage Cloud's virtual machines (VMs). VCC establishes such channels by communicating with the virtual machine manager running at each server. Such management helps in maintaining the agreed service level agreement with customers.
Trust establishment requires automated self-managed services that can manage Cloud infrastructure (considering both user properties and infrastructure properties) with minimum human intervention [1] . VCC will play a major role in providing Cloud's automated self-managed services, which are mostly provided manually at the time of writing. In previous work [1] , we focused on defining the functions of self-managed services. In this paper, we propose a provenance framework which is a key requirement for having automated and trustworthy self-managed services. Provenance helps self-managed services to reason about the changes across the distributed elements of Clouds; for example, it helps such services to understand the consequences of a decision and to realize the right action plan to be considered.
Motivating scenarios
We now discuss the importance of provenance in a Cloud using two simple example scenarios, as illustrated in Fig.  1 . We assume that a Cloud provider has six physical servers P S 1 to P S 6 , and two physical domains L 1 and L 2 . L 1 is allocated physical servers P S 1 to P S 3 , and L 2 is allocated physical servers P S 4 to P S 6 . We also assume that the Cloud provider hosts an application App. The Cloud provider creates a virtual domain V D 1 in the virtual layer to run App. V D 1 is initially allocated a one virtual resource, V R 1 , to host App. V D 1 is associated with a policy allowing it to scale its resources when there is an increase in demand using resources from physical domain L 1 .
Our first example demonstrates how a simple increase in load, and the corresponding reaction from the Cloud, can (ii) now both V R 1 and V R 2 process App, which are hosted using L 1 -assume that V R 1 is hosted by P S 1 and V R 2 is hosted by P S 2 ; (iii) P S 2 has hardware problems, which results in incorrect results being generated by App; (iv) load returns to normal, and so V D 1 downscales by removing V R 2 ; and (v) Cloud customers discover the problem and call the Cloud provider. If the Cloud provider only examines the logs of files generated by V R 1 and P S 1 , then they will not find the root case of the problem or how to rectify it.
Our second scenario focus on forensic provenance in the Cloud, as follows: (i) a security administrator reads the policy for V D 1 and understands that App can only be hosted using L 1 resource; (ii) the administrator updates the V D 1 policy to force V D 1 to use L 2 resources; (iii) the administrator then connects to L 2 physical resources and finds out that V D 1 resources are running on P S 4 , meaning that App is hosted there. The security administrator connects to P S 4 and indirectly extracts important information from App. P S 4 logs this activity; and (iv) the administrator restores the original policy, which forces V D 1 resources to switch back to L 1 . If the Cloud provider only examines log files generated by L 1 resources, then they will not discover who performed the attack or, even worse, they might never discover that an attack has happened in the first place. This is one of the main challenges that shows the importance of provenance considering the complex Cloud infrastructure and enormous distributed resources.
Log records management and requirements
In this section, we outline a possible approach for managing log records (i.e., partially cover point (ii) discussed in Sect. 1.2). Following that, we identified the system requirements.
Database design
As explained in Sect. 3, Cloud computing is composed of enormous processes running at distributed and heterogeneous resources. Various processes communicate horizontally and/or vertically amongst each other. Log records generated by such processes require experts in the domain to interpret and establish relationships amongst them, especially they are stored in a scatted log files. Our design objective is to address these problems and fulfil the following: -Move log records from their originating distributed processes to a centralized repository, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . By centralized, we do not mean a single storage neither we mean any restrictions on geographical locations. Specifically, we mean moving disperse log records to a centralized provenance system, which we also refer to as Log as a Service (LaaS). The LaaS should be protected against single points of failures, for example, replicated across different geographical locations such that each replica is supported by high availability infrastructure. -The log records should be easily queried using standard mechanisms; for example, ANSI SQL-92 [11] . -Associate individual log records with metadata. The metadata associate items of log records with labels which explain the original source of log records based on the outlined Cloud taxonomy. The metadata also establishe the relationship between different log records in the Cloud. These help tracking log records considering both vertical and horizontal communication channels amongst Cloud components and also considering Cloud dynamic nature. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified schema design of LaaS database whereby we transfer and store log records to a centralized LaaS repository. LaaS repository, for example, could be composed of a web-based log application supported by an appropriate distributed database management system (DBMS) (e.g., Oracle RAC and DataGaurd [23] ). We propose categorizing log records into four parts, each is stored in a dedicated set of tables. Three categories cover the three horizontal layers of Cloud taxonomy, while the last category for management tools' log. Each category is composed of two types of provenance data: (i) log records and (ii) a metadata describing the details behind each item of log records in the context of the discussed Cloud taxonomy. The transfer of the provenance data to the LaaS repository and the management of the LaaS repository itself are controlled by trustworthy services which we cover in Sect. 7.
The LaaS DBMS is expected to be highly transactional with enormous size, considering the huge number of elements of the Cloud. These properties require a careful distributed system design that maintains reliability, eliminates any single point of failure and maintains overall high system performance. Such properties also necessitate a log retention policy controlling the lifetime of log records (a retention policy should consider the type of log records, user requirements and other legislative measures). It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss these important issues and the LaaS DBMS schema design in further details, and we are currently working on a paper supported by a prototype covering such details.
Security requirements
The previous section outlines a simplified design of Cloud's log records management. We now identify the security requirements to transfer and manage such data, as follows (these are related to our stated objectives in points (iii) and (iv) discussed in Sect. 1.2): (i) provide assurance measures to the LaaS that the log records are generated and transferred from their source by trustworthy processes; (ii) provide assurance to the LaaS that the metadata associated with each item of the log records are correct; (iii) provide assurance measures to the processes which generate the log records that the Clouds' management processes are trusted to provide the correct metadata, and, in addition, the LaaS is trusted to protect the log records and the associated metadata; and (iv) provide assurance measures to interested parties (e.g., Cloud customers, auditors and even Cloud providers) about the trustworthiness and reliability of the LaaS mechanism to protect the log records and associated metadata. Subsequent sections focus on these points, which cover our objectives discussed in Sect. 1.2.
Other requirements and device properties
The above identified properties of the LaaS (i.e., enormous size and high transaction rates) and the identified requirements (e.g., highly available and reliable system with no single point of failure) necessitate careful design at the infrastructure and application levels, which we do not cover in this paper. LaaS, as a result, is expected to fully utilize multiple and redundant physical servers. Our proposed scheme requires the LaaS application to be installed and managed at dedicated physical servers which are physically separate from the other Cloud resources. In addition, we require LaaS to be managed by a dedicated provenance security administrators who do not manage the Cloud infrastructure, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . This is to enforce the separation of duty principle and to not have same people who manage both the Cloud infrastructure and the LaaS.
We require that physical layer's devices are commercial off-the-shelf hardware enhanced with trusted computing technology that incorporates a trusted platform module (TPM), as defined by the trusted computing group (TCG) specifications [28] . Trusted computing systems are platforms whose state can be remotely tested, and which can be trusted to store security-sensitive data in ways testable by a remote party. TCG is a wide subject and has been discussed by many researchers; we will not address the details of TCG specifications in this paper for space limitations (see, for example, [25] for further details about this subject). The TCG specifications require each trusted platform (TP) to include an additional hardware component, the TPM, to establish trust in that platform [25] . TPM has protected storage and protected capabilities. The entries of a TPM platform configuration registers (PCRs), where integrity measurements are stored, are used in the protected storage mechanism. This is achieved by comparing the current PCR values with the intended PCR values stored with the data object. If the two values are consistent, access is then granted and data are unsealed. Storage and retrieval are carried out by the TPM.
Framework domain architecture
In this section, we propose a LaaS domain architecture which forms the foundation for addressing the identified objectives. The architecture uses the dynamic domain concept which is proposed in [7] . We start by defining the dynamic domain concept and then discuss the adaptation of such concept to architect the framework.
Dynamic domain concept
Definition 6.1 A dynamic domain represents a group of devices that need to securely share a pool of content. Each dynamic domain has a unique identifier i D , a shared unique symmetric key k D and a specific P K L d composed of all devices in the dynamic domain. k D is shared by all authorized devices in a dynamic domain and is used to protect the dynamic domain content whilst in transit. This key is only available to devices that are member of the domain. Thus, only such devices can access the pool of content bound to the domain. Each device is required to securely generate for each dynamic domain a symmetric key k C , which is used to protect the dynamic domain content when stored in the device. The dynamic domain protocols are discussed in detail in [7] .
Domain architecture
The framework is composed of the following types of domains (see Fig. 3 ): Log as a Service Domain (LaaSD), Management Domain (MD), Collaborating Management Domain (CMD), Outsourced Domain (OD) and Collaborating Outsourced Domain (COD). We now map these domains using the Cloud infrastructure taxonomy concept, which we summarize in Sect. 3. An MD and CMD represent a physical domain and collaborating physical domain at the physical layer. An OD and COD represent a virtual domain and collaborating virtual domain at the virtual layer. LaaSD is composed of the LaaS-specific servers which hosts the LaaS system.
As we discussed earlier, the proposed framework extends some of the functions provided in our previous work [4] to make them provenance aware. The previous work established a trustworthy and controlled environment for the management of MD/CMD when hosting OD/COD. Subsequent sections identify the additional functions which we introduced at MD-to simplify the proposed scheme, this paper does not cover the integration of the provenance system with OD, COD and CMD, as these will increase the complexity of the paper and divert the focus, so we leave such important integration as a planned future work.
Definition 6.2 LaaS Domain (LaaSD):
Consists of platforms that host Cloud LaaS application. Section 5 outlines the design requirements of LaaSD's hosting platforms. LaaSD has a unique identifier i laas , two shared unique keys k laas and k laas−cca , and a specific P K L laas composed of all devices in the LaaSD. k laas is used to protect log records when transferred within LaaSD, while k laas−cca is used to protect log records when transferred from Cloud entities to LaaSD (specifically, between Cloud client agent and log client agent as will be explained latter). The credentials of LaaSD are defined in Definitions 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. LaaSD is associated with a provenance policy, which controls LaaSD behaviour and manages the provenance data, for example, data retention policy outlined in Sect. 5.
Definition 6.3
LaaSD identifier i laas is a unique number that we use to identify LaaSD. It is securely generated and protected by the TPM of VCC.
Definition 6.4
LaaSD key k laas is used to protect provenance data. k laas is a symmetric key that is securely generated and protected by the TPM of VCC. k laas is not available in the clear, it is shared between all devices member of LaaSD, and it can only be transferred from VCC to a device when it joins the LaaSD. Definition 6.5 LaaSD public key list (P K L laas ) is a LaaSDspecific list that is composed of the public keys of all devices of LaaSD. Provenance administrators assign devices to each LaaSD by providing each device public key to VCC in a form of PKL. The P K L laas is securely protected and managed by VCC. Definition 6.6 LaaSD key k laas−cca (also called LCA-CCA key) is used to protect the provenance data when transferred from Clouds' distributed elements to LaaS provenance application. k laas−cca is a symmetric key that is securely generated and protected by the TPM of VCC. k laas−cca is not available in the clear, it is shared between devices member of LaaSD and MD, and it can only be transferred from VCC to a device when the device joins MD or LaaSD. Definition 6.7 Management Domain: MD represents a group of devices at the physical layer. The capabilities of devices member of MD and their interconnections reflect the overall properties of the MD. Such properties enable the MD to serve the part of user requirements which can be matched only at the physical layer (e.g., location restrictions, resilience and scalability properties). An MD has a policy which manages the behaviour of its members and controls the behaviour of collaborating MDs, and in addition, the policy controls the transfer of log records and the association of metadata to LaaSD from across the distributed elements of Cloud infrastructure. The MD has credentials consisting of a unique identifier i md , a unique symmetric key k md , a public key list (P K L md ) and the shared LCA-CCA key provided by LaaSD, which have similar definitions to those provided in Definitions 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, respectively; however, (i) MD is not managed by the provenance administrators, and (ii) k md is used to protect infrastructure management data.
Framework software agents
The proposed framework architecture is composed of a set of software agents which are required to implement the functions of the framework (see Figs. 3, 4) . The software agents are as follows: (i) Cloud client agent (CCA), (ii) Cloud server Fig. 4 Software agents for Cloud provenance and management services agent (CSA), (iii) LaaS server agent (LSA), (iv) LaaS client agent (LCA) and (v) virtual machine agent (VMA). In our previous work [4] , we provided the required protocols for CCA and CSA which control the management of OD/COD at MD/CMD. As we discussed earlier, the objectives of our previous work are not the same as the objectives of this paper which necessitate introducing changes on CCA and CSA to provide an integrated framework. In the remaining part of this section, we discuss in details the functions of these agents and the changes we introduced at CCA and CSA to be provenance aware.
Assumption 7.1
We assume the identified software agents are designed in such a way that they do not reveal domain credentials in the clear, do not transfer domain protection keys to others, and do not transfer sensitive domain content unprotected to others. Although this is a strong assumption, however, recent research shows promises in the direction of satisfying such an assumption [17] . TCG compliant hardware using the sealing mechanism alone is not enough to address such an assumption. Trustvisor [17] moves one step forward and focuses on protecting content encryption key utilizing recent development in processors technology (e.g., Intel TXT); however, this does not protect clear text data once decrypted. Achieving this is one of our long-term objectives.
Cloud server agent
CSA is a trusted management agent that runs at VCC and has the following functions: (a) install CCA on physical devices excluding the ones related to LaaS servers (covered in [4] ); (b) manage MD/CMD policies and provenance policies; provenance policies provide assurance that log records are securely generated and transferred to authorized entities (MD/CMD policies are discussed in [4] ). These policies also provide assurance that trustworthy metadata are generated and associated with log records; (c) establish offline chains of trust between Cloud entities which include the following: (i) CSA and CCA (covered in [4] ) and (ii) collaborate with LSA to establish chains of trust between CSA and LSA, and CCA and LCA; and (d) create and manage MD/CMD (the creation is covered in [4] , while the management lacks parts of points b and c, as discussed above).
LaaS server agent
LSA is a trusted provenance agent which runs at VCC. LSA has the following functions: (a) install and manage LCA; (b) manage provenance policies which provide assurance that provenance data are only accessible to authorized entities and control provenance data retention; (c) establish offline chains of trust between provenance management agents (i.e., LSA and LCA), and between provenance management agents and other agents (i.e., LSA and CSA, and CCA and LCA); and (d) create and manage LaaSD which includes the following: (i) securely generating and storing LaaSD protection keys; (ii) attesting to the execution environment status of devices' LCA whilst being added to the domain and ensuring they are trusted to execute as expected, hence trusted to securely store the domain key and to protect domain content; and (iii) add and remove devices to a domain by releasing the domain-specific key to the LCA running on devices joining the LaaSD.
LaaS client agent
LCA is a trusted provenance agent which runs at physical platform member of the LaaSD. LCA has the following functions: (a) intermediate the communication between CSA/CCA and the provenance system, and between provenance security administrators and the provenance system; (b) assure verifiers that the provenance system operates in a trusted environment, that is, can access provenance data when its execution environment is trusted; and (c) manage and enforce organization policy related to the provenance operations as distributed by LSA.
VM agent
The VM agent is a trusted agent running at all virtual machines which are organized into ODs and CODs. The VM agent intermediates the communication between running processes inside the virtual machine and CCA-this paper only covers the secure storage of provenance data. The VM agent attests to the execution status of all running processes inside the VM and ensures that they are trusted to behave as expected. It then securely transfers the log records to CCA. The CCA, as explained next, is in charge of adding and binding the metadata to log records and then transferring the result to the LCA.
Cloud client agent
CCA is a trusted client-management agent running at resources of a physical layer (excluding the ones member of LaaSD). CCA has the following functions which are related to provenance system (these are additional functions to the ones discussed in our previous work, [4] ): (a) enforce provenance policy as distributed by the LSA via the CSA; (b) intermediate the communication between all processes running at the physical platform and the LCA. Specifically, it grabs the log records as forwarded from inside the VM and other processes in the hypervisor and then associates them with the required metadata. Subsequently, it sends the result to its allocated LCA; and (c) it sends its own log records (i.e., log records related to the management of virtual resources at physical resources) to its allocated LCA.
Framework workflow
This section discusses a possible workflow of the proposed system framework. The paper does not discuss OD/COD (i.e., it does not discuss VMs and the details of their agents), neither it discusses applications' provenance management. Discussing such details will drag us into extra complexities that divert the focus of the paper (future work will discuss the details of this). At this early stage of our work, we propose a set of protocols as a proof of concept with an informal security analysis. This is to clarify how the framework components could possibly be managed. Once we proceed in this work and address the identified challenges, we then need to provide a formal analysis in which the proposed protocols would likely to be updated.
Cloud server agent initialization
This section describes the procedure of initializing the CSA discussed in Sect. 7. Following are the notations used in this section: TPM is the TPM on VCC; S is the platform state at release as stored in the PCR inside the TPM; and (Pu, Pr) is a non-migratable key pair such that the private part of the key Pr is bound to TPM and to the platform state S. The following protocol functions are defined in [28] : TPM CreateWrapK ey , TPM Load K ey2 , TPM Seal and TPM Unseal .
The main objective of initializing the CSA is to prepare it to implement the framework of the proposed scheme. This includes the following: (i) Cloud security administrators install the CSA on VCC-the installation of the CSA includes generating a non-migratable key pair (Pr, Pu) to protect domain secrets; and (ii) the CSA manages security administrator(s) credentials and securely stores them to be used whenever administrator(s) need to be authenticated to CSA.
The first time security administrators run the CSA it performs the following initialization procedure (as described by Algorithm 1). The objective of this algorithm is to initialize the CSA. The CSA executes and sends a request to the VCCspecific TPM to generate a non-migratable key pair, which is used to protect domain secrets. TPM then generates this key and seals it to be used by the CSA when the hosting device execution status is trusted.
The CSA then needs to ensure that only security administrators can use the CSA. For this, the CSA instructs security administrators to provide their authentication credentials (e.g., password/PIN), as described by Algorithm 2. The objective of this algorithm is to enrol security administrators into the CSA. The CSA then requests the TPM to store the authentication credentials of the Cloud security administrators associated with its trusted execution environment state (i.e., the integrity measurement as stored in the TPM's PCR) in the VCC protected storage. We mean by storing data in a protected storage is 'sealing data' in TCG terms, so that data can only be accessed by the trusted server agent. The authentication credential is used to authenticate security administrators before using the CSA; see Algorithm 3.
Given the definitions and the assumptions above, the protocol is described by Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. The objective of the protocol is installing the server agent at VCC, which generates the non-migratable key to encrypt the CSA secrets. The protocols are used by security administrators when interacting with the server agent.
LaaS server agent initialization
The process of initializing LSA exactly follows the same process and algorithms described for initializing CSA in Sect. 8.1. The main differences are as follows: (i) LaaS should be managed by provenance security administrators who should not have access to the CSA. Similarly, CSA security administrators should not have access to the LSA; (ii) LaaS should have its specific non-migratable key pair which is independent from CSA key pair; and (iii) as we outlined in Sect.
3.2, although both LSA and CSA run at VCC, however, this does not mean that VCC is a single entity. It is most likely to be the opposite (as currently implemented, for example, in OpenStack) has multiple different entities each could be allocated a specific function for scalability, performance and security reasons.
LCA and CCA initialization
This section describes the procedure of initializing client agents, which could be LCA or CCA. The goal of this procedure is to prepare devices to participate in Clouds. This covers generating a non-migratable key to protect important credentials at client devices.
The protocol of initializing a LCA and CCA is described by Algorithm 4. The objective of this algorithm is to install a copy of the agent, which generates a non-migratable key to protect device's credentials. TPM, S and (Pu, Pr) have the same meanings provided earlier.
LaaS domain establishment
In this section, we discuss the procedure of establishing LaaSD, which is managed by the LSA. In the provided protocol, we use the same notations described earlier. In this subsection, we require that the LSA has already been installed and initialized, exactly as described earlier in Sect. 8.2. This includes installing the LSA, which interacts with the TPM to generate a non-migratable key pair that can be only used by the agent. This key pair is used to protect LaaS secrets.
LaaSD establishment begins when provenance security administrators want to establish a LaaSD. The administrators instruct the LSA to create a new LaaSD. The server agent authenticates administrators as described by the Algorithm 3. If authentication succeeds, the server agent interacts with the TPM to securely generates the LaaS-specific domain key k laas and identifier i laas , and a specific key k laas−cca to be used to establish trusted channel between LCA and CCA. These are described by Algorithm 5.
At the successful completion of this protocol, LaaS credentials are initialized, which include the domain key, the domain identifier, the LCA-CCA key and an empty PKL. These are protected by LSA running at VCC, which manages LaaSD membership.
Provenance security administrators assign selected physical devices to LaaSD based on the devices properties that could fulfil the required overall LaaSD properties. As we discuss in Sect. 8.5, the LSA securely transfers the domain credentials to joining log devices. It also transfers the key k laas−cca associated with i laas to the CSA. The CSA in turn transfers the key to joining CCA (see Sect. 8.7), which would establish an offline chain of trust between CCA and LCAs.
Adding devices to LaaSD
This section describes the process for adding a device to a LaaSD. Following notations are used in the provided protocol: TPM LC A is the TPM of the device running the LCA; TPM L S A is the TPM of the device running the LSA; S LC A is the platform state at release as stored in the PCR inside the TPM LC A ; S L S A is the platform state at release as stored in the PCR inside the TPM L S A; (Pu LC A , Pr LC A ) is non-migratable key pairs such that the private part of the key Pr LC A is bound to TPM LC A and to the platform state S LC A ; (Pu L S A , Pr L S A ) is non-migratable key pairs such that the private part of the key Pr L S A is bound to TPM L S A and to the platform state S L S A ; i laas is LaaSD-specific identifier; PKL is the LaaSD public key list; k laas is the LaaSD-specific content protection key; k laas−cca is the LCA-CCA-specific key for protecting content transferred between CCA and LaaS and to establish trust between both entities; Cert L S A is the LSA device certificate; Cert LC A is the joining LCA device certificate; A L S A is an identifier for the LaaS server device included in Cert L S A ; A LC A is an identifier for the LaaS client device included in Cert LC A ; Pr L S A− AI K is the corresponding private key of the public key included in Cert L S A ; Pr LC A− AI K is the corresponding private key of the public key included in Cert LC A ; N 1 is a randomly generated nonce; N 2 is a randomly generated nonce; ePu L C A(Y ) denotes the asymmetric encryption of data Y using key Pu LC A , and where we assume that the encryption primitive in use provides non-malleability, as described in [15] ; and SHA1 is a one-way hash function.
The LCA sends a join domain request to the LSA. This request includes the LaaSD-specific identifier i laas this is achieved as follows.
LCA→LSA: Join_Domain Two algorithms are then initiated to add the device to the domain. The first algorithm involves the LaaS server and client agents to mutually authenticate each other conforming to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol [14] . LSA sends an attestation request to LCA to prove its trustworthiness, LCA then sends the attestation outcome to LSA. These steps are achieved using Algorithm 6.
Adding a device into a domain uses Algorithm 7, which starts upon successful completion of Algorithm 6. The objective of Algorithm 7 is to securely transfer the key k laas and k laas−cca to the LCA. Both keys are sealed on the device hosting the LCA, so that they are only released to the LCA when its execution environment is as expected. If the execution status of the device running LCA is trusted, LSA checks if the device's public key is included in the public key list of the domain. If so, it securely releases the domain-specific key k laas and the LCA-CCA-specific key to LCA using Algorithm 7. The keys are sealed on LCA's device, so that they are only released to LCA when its execution environment is as expected.
Upon the successful completion of the above algorithms, the LaaS client and server agents establish a trusted secure communication channel that is used to transfer the LaaSD key and policy to the LCA. The established secure channel, importantly, provides the assurance to the LSA about the state of the client agent and forces the future use of the transferred key to the agent on specific trusted state. The device hosting LCA is now part of the domain, as it possesses a copy of the key k laas , and its public key matches the one stored in the server agent. Member devices of the domain can access the domain log records which are now shared by all devices member of the LaaSD.
Establishing trust between server agents
Before establishing an MD domain, we should first establish a chain of trust between both CSA and LSA. This would help in establishing a transparent chain of trust between the CCA running at each member device of MD and LCA that runs at each member device of LaaSD, as we discuss it latter. For clarity, we do not assume that the LSA and CSAs are hosted at a single VCC (as we indicated earlier VCC could be composed of multiple, but collaborating entities). Following notations are used in the provided protocol: TPM L S A is the TPM of the device running the LSA; TPM C S A is the TPM of the device running the CSA; S L S A is the platform state at release as stored in the PCR inside the TPM L S A ; S C S A is the platform state at release as stored in the PCR inside the TPM C S A ; (Pu L S A , Pr L S A ) is non-migratable key pairs such that the private part of the key Pr L S A is bound to TPM L S A and to the platform state S L S A ; (Pu C S A , Pr C S A ) is non-migratable key pairs such that the private part of the key Pr C S A is bound to TPM C S A and to the platform state S C S A ; i laas is LaaSDspecific identifier; i md is MD domain-specific identifier; k is a specific shared key between Cloud and LSAs; Cert C S A is the LSA device certificate;Cert L S A is the CSA device certificate; A C S A is an identifier for the LSA device included in Cert C S A ; A L S A is an identifier for the CSA device included in Cert L S A ; Pr C S A−AI K is the corresponding private key of the public key included in Cert C S A ; Pr L S A− AI K is the corresponding private key of the public key included in Cert L S A ; N 1 is a randomly generated nonce; N 2 is a randomly generated nonce; e Pu L S A (Y ) denotes the asymmetric encryption of data Y using key Pu L S A , and where we assume that the encryption primitive in use provides non-malleability, as described in [15] ; and SHA1 is a one-way hash function.
The LSA sends an established trusted channel request to the CSA as follows.
LSA→CSA: Establish_Trusted_Channel Two algorithms are then initiated to establish the trusted channel and to transfer management data across. The first algorithm involves the LSA and CSA to mutually authenticate each other conforming to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol [14] . The agents attest each other to prove their trustworthiness. These steps are achieved using an algorithm which is exactly the same as the one in 6. The second algorithm (Algorithm 8) starts upon successful completion of the Algorithm 6. The objective of this algorithm is to securely establish a shared key k that can only be accessed by both agents when their execution status is as expected. Upon the successful completion of the two algorithms, the LSA and CSAs establish a trusted secure communication channel that is used to transfer the related provenance policy and other secret data between both agents. In addition, such a trusted channel, as we discuss latter, would help in establishing a transparent chains of trust between LCAs and CCAs. The established trusted secure channel provides the assurance to both agents about their states and forces the future use of the transferred key to be on specific trusted state. Next sections build on successful completion of the provided protocols when storing and querying log records and when validating the trustworthiness of the log management processes.
MD establishment and management
In this subsection, we require that the CSA has already been installed and initialized, LaaSD has been established, and a trusted channel between LSA and CSA has been established, exactly as described earlier in Sects. 8.1, 8.4 and 8.6, respectively. The establishment of an MD follows similar steps to those provided in Algorithm 5 with the following changes: (i) the CSA does not generate the shared LCA-CCA key, and it rather requests it from the LSA using the trusted channel established in Algorithm 8; and (ii) after the CCA receives this key, it securely stores the key along with other MD credentials.
Adding a device to MD also follows similar steps to those provided in Algorithms 6 and 7 with the following changes: (i) the mutual authentication protocol (Algorithms 6) needs to be updated to establish a chain of trust between CSA and CCA rather than LSA and LCA; (ii) a chain of trust need to be established between LCA and CCA in Algorithm 7. This is transparently established when CSA sends the shared LCA-CCA key to CCA (how this is achieved is discussed in Sect. 10); (iii) the CSA regularly receives changes related to provenance management and policies from LSA using the trusted channel established in Algorithm 8; and (iv) the CSA (by collaborating with the LSA, as in point (iii) sends to CCA the metadata to use with the log records such as physical device-id reflecting the CCA's device identifier at VCC database, MD-id the CCA is a member of, CMD-ids the MD is a member of, VMs that the CCA would manage, and the policy that controls how the CCA interacts with the LCA.
Secure log storage
In this section, we discuss a possible approach for storing Cloud provenance data using the proposed LaaSD.
We, now, list the main steps for storing a log record generated by a process P which is hosted at physical device D. Whenever a process P generates a log record, L OG, it sends the L OG to the CCA running at D as follows: The CCA, as discussed earlier, is assigned to a LaaSD and a pre-agreed shared CCA-LCA-specific key, k laas−cca . Such key can only be accessed by the assigned agents when their execution environment is as expected. We assume, for performance reasons, that the CCA and LCAs keep such keys pre-loaded in memory (we assumed in Assumption 7.1 that a mechanism is in place to protect sensitive data whilst being in memory). Loading such key is done as follows. As discussed above, we require that LaaS pre-loads the shared key k laas−cca . LaaS then decrypts the string and reencrypts only the L OG field using the LaaSD-specific key k laas as follows. Finally, LaaS stores the encrypted L OG record and the extracted metadata in a set of tables inside the provenance DBMS (identified in Sect. 5). We require that the LaaS DBMS provides additional protection measures of the stored provenance data. Example of this is what is known by Oracle Wallet [22] . In this, the DBMS automatically stores the data encrypted inside the DBMS. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss or analyse the process of securely storing data inside the DBMS, and it is a planned future work.
LaaS

Threat analysis
In this section, we informally analyse the threats, services and mechanisms for the provenance framework workflow proposed in Sect. 8. We focus on the threats, services and mechanisms that apply to provenance and management data, and the MD and LaaSD domains' credential.
Provenance and Cloud security administrators when interacting with the server agents running at VCC could violate their privileges by adding unauthorized devices to a domain or even an unauthorized party could steal security administrators authentication credentials to add an unauthorized device into a domain. The administrators authorization violation threat can be mitigated by combining different measures, for example: (a) requiring that N out of M administrators successfully authenticate themselves directly to the VCC for request authorization; (b) using logging and auditing mechanisms that could detect abnormalities in the system; and (c) using the policy of separation of duty, for example, prevent administrators (both provenance and Cloud) from accessing log files, which are routinely examined by auditors. The stealing of administrators credentials, on the other hand, can be mitigated by using strong authentication measures which involve a combination of "something the administrator has," for example, a smart card; "the security administrator is," for example, biometric verification; and/or "the security administrator knows," for example, a password or PIN. At this foundation stage, the paper does not cover the implementation and enforcement of such mechanisms.
The server software agents running at VCC raise the following security threats when processing and storing system credentials: unauthorized manipulation of system credentials during use in the VCC,and/or unauthorized manipulation of system credentials whilst stored in the VCC. The confidentiality and integrity protection of system credentials during execution in a VCC requires process isolation techniques, in which software agents run in isolation, free from being observed or compromised by other processes running in the same protected partition or by software running in any insecure partition. This paper does not cover this point; however, we assumed in Assumption 7.1 that such a protection mechanism is in place and leave its details for future work. The confidentiality and integrity of system credentials whilst stored in the VCC requires protected storage capabilities, as discussed in Sect. 5.3 and Algorithm 5. The protected storage capabilities use TPM functions to protect domain credentials. TPM is tamper evident, and so it is not easy for the protected credentials to get hacked in normal circumstances. However, TPM cannot protect itself from physical attacks, and in addition, domain keys could possibly be revealed in different ways such as brute-force attack. Lessening the impact of such threats requires key management. The Cloud policy makers decide on the key management policy (e.g., frequency of refreshing domain keys, what should happen if a device is hacked, etc). In this paper, we do not cover the key management part, neither we consider policy management and enforcement mechanisms.
The interaction between a client software agent running on a device joining a domain and the corresponding server software agent running at VCC raises the following threats to the corresponding domain key whilst in transit: unauthorized reading or alteration of the domain key whilst in transit, the VCC wittingly/unwittingly sending the domain key to a malicious entity, a device wittingly/unwittingly receiving the domain key from a malicious entity, and a replay of communications between the VCC and the added device. The confidentiality and integrity of the domain whilst in transit, as discussed in Sect. 8.5 , is provided by the use of asymmetric encryption where we assume that the encryption primitive in use provides non-malleability. Entity authentication of a device to a VCC involves a protocol exchange between the device and the VCC, as discussed in Algorithm 6. It is initiated when the VCC and the joining device mutually authenticate to each other. This mutual authentication attests to the scheme applications execution status and whether the platform is trusted. By this, the VCC can only communicate with a trusted entity and so cannot unwittingly send the domain key to a malicious entity. Similarly, the device agent, if it is not operating properly, cannot get the domain key, and so it cannot wittingly send it to a malicious entity (see Algorithms 7, 8 The confidentiality and integrity of the domain key during execution on a device is covered in Assumption 7.1 as discussed above for the VCC. The confidentiality and integrity of the domain key whilst stored in a device, as discussed above, does not only require protected storage capabilities but also key and policy management and enforcement mechanisms. The confidentiality and integrity of domain content during execution on a device follows the same discussion as of the point of protecting the domain key during execution in the device. The confidentiality and integrity of domain content is protected by encrypting it using the domain key whilst stored on a device where we assume that the encryption primitive in use provides authenticated encryption. The encryption key is bound to the device's trusted environment, as discussed in Sect. 8.8.
10 Discussion, future directions and conclusion
Establishing trust
In this part, we discuss the foundation of trust establishment between different Clouds entities. A client or a verifier (which could, for example, be a Cloud customer, Cloud employee or a third party) needs to assess the trustworthiness of a running application in the Cloud. This includes assessing the trustworthiness of a Cloud to manage the infrastructure and the provenance system. If the result is positive, the verifier can then trust the operation of Clouds and would only need to assess the trustworthiness of the running application. We now discuss how the proposed framework goes in this direction in more details-it is outside the scope of this paper to go in the details of trust measurement, and it is a planned future work.
As we discussed earlier, one of the responsibilities of LSA is to establish a trustworthy LaaSD to manage the provenance data of Cloud elements. The first step is to install LCAs at carefully selected log-specific devices. LSA then verifies the trustworthiness of LCA and assures users about the trustworthy behaviour of LCA when managing the LaaSD. In other words, untrusted LCA will automatically be evicted from managing the LaaSD. Thus, a verifier only needs to measure and then assess the trustworthiness of LSA. If trusted, the verifier can then implicitly assume that LCA (which is managed by LSA) is trusted to manage the LaaSD. Assessing the trustworthiness of LSA is not enough by itself. This is because the operation of Clouds infrastructure (e.g., hosting of billing application) is managed by the CSA and CCA, while the log records are managed by LSA and LCA. Therefore, a verifier would also need to measure and then verify the trustworthiness of the CSA as well as the LSA. As in the case of assessing the trustworthiness of log management, a verifier does not need to measure and assess the trustworthiness of the CCA. It is rather the opposite as the verifier should not, indeed, get involved into understanding complexities of Cloud infrastructure [6] . As in the case of LSA, one of the key functions of the CSA is to assure users that only trustworthy CCA can manage Cloud infrastructure and untrusted agents will automatically be evicted from the MD.
A chain of trust is also required between both CCA and LSA, which is provided based on the above chains of trust, as follows: (i) we established a chain of trust between LSA and LCA; (ii) we established a chain of trust between LSA and CSA; and (iii) we established a chain of trust between CSA and CCA. Using these chains of trust, we transparently established a chain of trust between CCAs and LCAs.
To conclude, a verifier should not (read as must not) get involved into understanding the details of Cloud infrastructure. The identified chains of trust help in this direction, as a verifier only needs to attest to the trustworthiness of the requested application and the VCC which runs both the LSA and CSA.
10.2 Achievement of objectives Section 1.2 identifies four key requirement for trustworthy secure Clouds provenance which we now discuss the ones covered in this paper. We partially address requirement (ii) as follows: (a) provide a high-level design of a provenance system which is built on distributed DBMS engine; (b) associate each item of log record with a metadata identifying the recorded log in the context of Cloud taxonomy; and (c) identify the provenance system requirements. We covered requirement (iii) as follows: (a) establish LaaSD which manages the secure sharing of provenance data between LaaSD member devices; (b) update our previous work on Cloud infrastructure management [4] to associate provenance metadata with log records; and (c) integrate our previous work with this paper framework enabling the secure transfer of log records from their originating processes to the log repository. The previous subsection discusses how we partially cover point (iv) which is related to trust management-more work are still needed on this point which is related to trust evaluation in Clouds. Section 8.8 provides a possible approach of how the integrated framework could possibly work. However, this is not enough by itself to assure provenance data integrity and confidentiality whilst being stored and processed within the LaaSD. For example, this paper do not discuss key management, policy management and protecting sensitive data whilst being processed. These are complex subjects, especially in Cloud context, to be covered in this paper, and we leave them as a planned future work.
Conclusion
This paper discusses an important topic in Clouds computing which has not yet received considerable attention. It proposes a framework for trustworthy Cloud's provenance. Cloud provenance is a key requirement to establish the foundation for providing trust in the Cloud. Establishing trust in the Cloud requires trustworthy self-managed services that can automatically and with minimal human intervention manage Cloud users resources at the Cloud infrastructure. Such self-managed services require trustworthy Cloud provenance as it helps in taking the right action on changes and incidents. Cloud provenance has many additional advantages, for example, a key requirement in forensic investigation. This paper does not provide an exhaustive secure framework neither we provide a formal security analysis of the framework. For example, we do not cover key management neither we cover database security subjects. This is because discussing such topics is a whole area of research in Clouds context. In addition, the proposed framework still requires further extensions which, likely, to introduce some changes. The proposed framework addresses part of the identified requirements and establishes a foundation for further research to address other requirements.
